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ESSAYS
SHADOWBOXING: AN ESSAY ON POWER
Richard Delgado t
INTRODUCTION
It is important to know when we are being gulled, manipulated,
and duped.' It is even more important to know when we are unwit-
tingly doing this to ourselves-when we are using shopworn legal
scripts and counterscripts, going around endlessly in circles, getting
nowhere. 2 Understanding how we use predictable arguments to re-
but other predictable arguments in a predictable sequence--"The
plaintiff should have the freedom to do X," "No-the defendant
should have the security not to have X done to her"; "The law
should be flexible, permitting us to do justice in particular cases,"
"No-the law must be determinate; only bright-line rules are ad-
ministrable and safe" 3-frees us to focus on real-world questions
that do matter. We can begin to see how the actions we take as
lawyers, law students, and legal scholars advance or retard princi-
ples we hold dear.4 We can see where the scripts come from and,
perhaps, how to write new and better ones.5
t Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D. 1974 ,
University of California at Berkeley. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance and sugges-
tions of Pierre Schlag, Erich Schwiesow, and Kelly Robinson in the preparation of this
essay.
1 See Richard Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989) [hereinafter Oppositionists]; Pierre Schlag, Normative and No-
where To Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990); Stephen L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1881 (1991). See also MAURICE MEMLEAU-
PoNtry, SENSE AND NON-SENSE (Hubert L. Dreyfus & Patricia Allen Dreyfus trans., 1964).
2 See Schlag, supra note 1; see generally Symposium, The Critique of Normativity, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 801 (1991) (discussing ways in which the dominant forms of legal discourse
mystify and misdirect our efforts). See also Richard Delgado, Mindset and Metaphor, 103
HARv. L. REV. 1872 (1990) (noting that the structures and metaphors of legal discourse
mislead).
3 For an amusing treatment of these standoffs of legal and popular proverbs, see
Jeremy Paul, The Politics of Legal Semiotics, 69 Tax. L. REV. 1779, 1786, 1816 (1991).
4 See Oppositionists, supra note 1; Winter, supra note 1, at 1919-26.
5 Supra note 1. See Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform:
Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE LJ. 923 (1988) [hereinafter Will We Ever Be Saved?]. On
the role of script-writing, see PAUL RICOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE (1988); Robert M.
Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4
(1983). Will the new scripts be less banal than the old ones? For a discussion of reasons
that counsel caution, see Oppositionists, supra note 1; infra note 31.
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I
AN EXAMPLE-"SUBJECTIVE" VERSUS "OBJECTIVE"
STANDARDS
Everyone knows that in many areas the law prefers "objective"
over "subjective" standards for judging conduct. Tort law uses the
reasonable person doctrine,6 contract law applies objective rules to
determine when a contract has been formed and what its terms
mean, 7 and so forth. Where does this preference come from, and
what does it say about ourselves and our legal culture? Does the
objective-subjective distinction hold up under analysis? When we
rehearse the familiar arguments -in favor of one approach or the
other,8 what are we doing, and what is at stake?
I address these questions by analyzing the standards used in
three areas: cigarette warnings, informed consent to medical treat-
ment, and date rape.9 Tobacco companies defend their marketing
of a product known to cause cancer, heart disease, and a host of
other illnesses by invoking the narratives of freedom and consent.10
The warnings they place on cigarette packages are visible and easy
to read. Purchasers who smoke despite these warnings must be
deemed to consent to the risks of that activity;"1 any more effective
measure would unacceptably impair freedom of action. To the ob-
jections that some consumers are addicted, will ignore the warnings,
or will bow to social pressure,' 2 the manufacturers reply that the
warnings are what an ordinary consumer living in our society would
expect when purchasing a somewhat hazardous product, and that no
further effort on their part is necessary.' 3
6 WiLu ' L. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 149-50 (4th ed. 1971).
7 JOHN P. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CoNTRAcrs 23-25, 118-23, 328-29 (1st
ed. 1970).
8 For example, consider the following arguments in favor of an objective ap-
proach: It is easily ascertained and administered; it encourages freedom of action; and it
fosters social interaction and the development of consensus. See infra notes 38-40 and
accompanying text.
9 I introduce a fourth example, drawn from legal scholarship, in my conclusion.
Infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
10 For an example of litigation concerning cigarette manufacturers, see Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct.
1386 (1991). For a discussion of such litigation, see Richard C. Ausness, Compensation for
Smoking-Related Injuries: An Alternative to Strict Liability in Tort, 36 WAYNE L. REv. 1085
(1990); Donald W. Garner, Cigarettes and Welfare Reform, 26 EMORY LJ. 269 (1977).
11 See Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 184-87; Donald W. Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil
Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1423 (1980).
12 See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. Social pressure, of course, is a spe-
cial problem for youth.
13 See authorities cited supra note 11.
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One aspect of the debate on cigarette warnings is currently
before the Supreme Court. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., a widow
whose husband died of smoking-induced lung disease sued a large
cigarette manufacturer for damages.' 4 The issue on appeal is
whether federal law, which requires only the current labeling, super-
sedes state tort law, under which a stricter standard of liability might
be applied to cases like the Cipollones'. Not surprisingly, the defen-
dant advocates application of the more formal, and more easily sat-
isfied, federal standard; the plaintiff, the more flexible state-law tort
approach.
The law of informed consent to medical treatment1 5 operates in
a similar fashion. Before performing medical operations or other
invasive procedures, doctors must communicate to the patient what
a reasonable person would want to know about the material risks
and benefits of the procedure, and must obtain the patient's con-
sent.1 6 It is immaterial whether the patient has an undisclosed or
highly personalized fear or preference that, if known, would have
called for further information or a different course of action. The
law requires only the doctor's initial disclosure of "objective"
information.
Some physicians, to be sure, may go further, asking, "Is there
anything else you are concerned about?" But it is the rare doctor
who asks the patient about her specific feelings and attitudes toward
pain, incapacity, dependency, death, risk aversiveness, reproductive
faculties, and religion-a few of the matters that could bear signifi-
cantly on a medical decision. Answers to these questions might sug-
gest to the doctor the necessity of further discussions with the
patient, further disclosures, or a different course of treatment.
The case law of informed consent makes clear, however, that
the physician's duty to disclose is simpler and more easily satisfied.
The leading case in this area, Cobbs v. Grant, requires that the doctor
disclose to the patient the reasonable risks and complications of the
contemplated procedure and, beyond this, what a competent mem-
14 111 S. Ct. 1386. See also Court Urged to Lift Shield Against Suits by Smokers, WASH.
POST, Oct. 9, 1991, at A16 (reporting oral argument in Cipollone).
15 See Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, Informed Consent in Human Experimentation:
Bridging the Gap Between Ethical Thought and Current Practice, 34 UCLA L. REv. 67 (1986).
See generallyJAY KATz, M.D., THE SILENT WORLD OF Doc:TOR AND PATIENT (1984) (discuss-
ing the doctor-patient relationship).
16 If the doctor does not make the disclosure, and the risk eventuates, the doctor
will be liable for damages if the patient can show the nondisclosure was material-i.e.,
affected her claim. For discussions of informed consent, see Delgado & Leskovac, supra
note 15, at 67 n.1; Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1972) (en banc).
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ber of the medical community would disclose. 17 Although more ex-
acting standards have been proposed,' 8 they are not yet the law.
The debate on date rape is similarly structured:1 9 men gener-
ally prefer an objective standard, women a more broad-based, sub-
jective one. If a man can truthfully report that a woman
accompanied him without protest, did not resist his advances, and
began disrobing when he did, the man wants those actions to be
deemed consent.20 For many date-rape activists, however, that con-
duct is only the beginning of the story. Under a subjective standard,
other factors are relevant to the issue of consent. We also need to
know whether the woman felt coerced or intimidated. 21 Perhaps
they were at a party where they drank too much liquor. Perhaps the
woman felt social pressure to pair off. Perhaps she was afraid to say
no, afraid of ostracism or of having to go home alone in the dark if
the man grew disgusted and left. Perhaps the atmosphere was such
that a woman could not easily say no.22
Men generally find this type of response infriiating: in their
view, women just want to be able to change their minds, depending
on what happens later-how he behaves (does he send flowers?),
how she feels in the morning, whether or not she becomes preg-
nant.23 Men want the woman's outward behavior at the time of the
incident to be conclusive: if a reasonable observer would interpret
her actions to signal willingness to have sex, that should end the
inquiry. A more individualized approach would chill legitimate
courtship behavior, encourage bogus claims, and be impossible to
17 502 P.2d at 11.
18 Delgado & Leskovoc, supra note 15 (proposing an interactive standard which
would require physicians to probe more deeply the patient's need for information, and
to do so at different stages of treatment and consultation.); N. Jan Almquist, Comment,
When the Truth Can Hurt: Patient-Mediated Informed Consent in Cancer Therapy, 9 UCLA-
ALAsKA L. REv. 143 (1980) (suggesting an iterative, multistage approach to informed
consent). See also ROBERT A. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN
DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONS (1979) (proposing dialogic or partnership approach to doc-
tor-patient interaction); KArz, supra note 15 (proposing radical reform in way we think
about the potential physician relationship).
19 Nancy Gibbs, When Is It Rape?, TIME,June 3, 1991, at 48; Philip Weiss, The Second
Revolution-Sexual Politics on Campus: A Case Study, HARPERS' MAG., Apr. 1991, at 58.
20 Weiss, supra note 19, at 58-61, 72.
21 Id at 59-62, 66-67. See also Ellen Goodman, He Says Date, She Says Rape, BOULDER
DAILY CAMERA (Colorado), May 3, 1991, at 10-A.
22 For a discussion of how such factors affect an analysis of a rape incident, see
Gibbs, supra note 19, at 50.
23 See Gibbs, supra note 19, at 52 (discussing a rape charge as a second thought,
brought the morning after, or even a month after, the incident); Goodman, supra note
21; Weiss, supra note 19, at 59-62, 66-67.
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adjudicate.2 4 Additionally, it might patronize, encouraging women
to see themselves as weak, easily led, and in need of protection.
II
WHAT THE SUBJECTIWE-OBJECTIVE DEBATE SHOWS-AND
CONCEALS
Underlying these stylized debates about subjective versus ob-
jective standards is a well-hidden issue of cultural power, one neatly
concealed by elaborate arguments that predictably invoke predict-
able "principle."2 5 These arguments invite us to take sides for or
against abstract values that lie on either side of a well-worn analyti-
cal divide, having remarkably little to do with what is at stake. The
arguments mystify and sidetrack, rendering us helpless in the face of
powerful repeat players like corporations, human experimenters,
actiort-loving surgeons, and sexually aggressive men.26
How does this happen? Notice that in many cases it is the
stronger party-the tobacco company, surgeon, or male date-that
wants to apply an objective standard to a key event.2 7 The doctor
wants the law to require disclosure only of the risks and benefits the
average patient would find material.28 The male partygoer wants
the law to ignore the woman's subjective thoughts in favor of her
outward manifestations.2 9 The tobacco company wants the warning
on the package to be a stopper. Generally, the law complies.
What explains the stronger party's preference for an objective
approach, and the other's demand for a more personalized one? It
is not that one approach is more principled, more just, or even more
24 These are the standard arguments used to justify objective liability rules in gen-
eral. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text; infra notes 44-45. See also Alice Kahn,
'Date Rape' Studies Called Exaggerated, S.F. CHRON., May 31, 1991, at Al (activists "trivial-
ize" rape by broadening its definition beyond reason, equating "sweet talk" with coer-
don, pressure with force, and a drink with intoxication).
25 For a discussion of the way in which elaborate scripts or arguments over "princi-
ple" often conceal something else, see Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: To-
ward a Citique of Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1991) [hereinafter
Normal Science]; Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801
(1991).
26 Normal Science, supra note 25, at 955-65; see also Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves'
Come Out Ahead. Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974).
27 Cf infra notes 41-69 and accompanying text (weaker parties often prefer more
contextualized standard). For a discussion of the connection between rules and power,
see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987). See also the storm
of criticism that followed the release of Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991)
("reasonable woman" case); Lisa Stansky, The Reasonable Trust, THE RECORDER, Nov. 11,
1917 at 1.
28 See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1972) (adopting lay standard of
disclosure under which physician must disclose those risks a reasonable patient would
find material).
29 Supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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likely to produce a certain result than the other. Rather, in my opin-
ion, the answer lies in issues of power and culture. It is now almost
a commonplace that we construct the social world.30 We do this
through stories, narratives, myths, and symbols-by using tools that
create images, categories, and pictures.3 1 Over time, through repe-
tition, the dominant stories seem to become true and natural, and
are accepted as "the way things are."32 Recently, outsider jurispru-
dence33 has been developing means, principally "counterstorytel-
ling," to displace or overturn these comfortable majoritarian myths
and narratives.3 4 A well-told counterstory can jar or displace the
dominant account.35
The debate on objective and subjective standards touches on
these issues of world-making and the social construction of reality.
Powerful actors, such as tobacco companies and male dates, want
objective standards applied to them simply because these standards
always, and already, reflect them and their culture. These actors
have been in power; their subjectivity long ago was deemed "objec-
tive" and imposed on the world.3 6 Now their ideas about meaning,
action, and fairness are built into our culture, into our view of male-
female, doctor-patient, and manufacturer-consumer relations.3 7
It is no surprise, then, that judgment under an "objective" (or
reasonable person) standard generally will favor the stronger party.
This, however, is not always the case: Rules that too predictably and
reliably favored the strong would be declared unprincipled.38 The
stronger actor must be able to see his favorite principles as fair and
30 See PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS Luc mAN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REAL-
rry (1967); NELSON GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING (1978); RICOEUR, supra note 5.
31 Supra note 29. For a discussion of the difficulty in escaping the bonds of pre-
existing categories and thought-structures, see Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Why
Do We Tell the Same Stories? Law Reform, Critical Librarianship and the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42
STAN. L. REV. 207 (1989) [hereinafter Same Stories]; Schlag, supra note 1.
32 Will We Ever Be Saved?, supra note 5, at 929-46.
33 See Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, Outsider Jurisprudence and the Electronic
Revolution: Will Technology Help or Hinder the Cause of Law Reform?, 52 OHIO ST. LJ. 847
(1991) (explaining the term "outsider jurisprudence" as applied to the oppositional
writing of gays, lesbians, and persons of color, among others). On outsider jurispru-
dence, see generally Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Repara-
tions, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987).
34 For a discussion of the legal storytelling movement, see Oppositionists, supra
note 1; Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989) [hereinafter Legal
Storytelling].
35 Oppositionists, supra note 1, at 2413-15, 2431-38.
36 Supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text; see also MICHEL FOUCAULT,
POWER/KNOWLEDGE (1972).
37 Supra note 30. See also JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (1976); ArroNIo
GRAMsCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey N.
Smith trans. & eds., 1971).
38 See Will We Ever Be Saved?, supra note 5, at 931 (discussing the role of sincerity in
the liberal's justification of the world as it is).
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just-ones that a reasonable society would rely upon in contested
situations.3 9 He must be able to depict the current standards as in-
tegral to justice, freedom, fairness, and administrability-to every-
thing short of the American Way itself (and maybe even that, since
societies that regulate these relationships more closely are paternal-
istic, and verge on (shhh!) socialism). 40
III
How OBJECTIVITY DOES ITS WORK
We have cleverly built power's view of the appropriate standard
of conduct into the very term fair.4l Thus, the stronger party is able
to have his way and see himself as principled at the same time.42
Imagine, for example, a man's likely reaction to the suggestion
that subjective considerations-a woman's mood, her sense of pres-
sure or intimidation, how she felt about the man, her unexpressed
fear of reprisals if she did not go ahead 4 3 -ought to play a part in
determining whether the man is guilty of rape. Most men find this
suggestion offensive; it requires them to do something they are not
accustomed to doing. "Why," they say, "I'd have to be a mind
reader before I could have sex with anybody!" 44 "Who knows, any-
-way, what internal inhibitions the woman might have been harbor-
ing?" And "what if the woman simply changed her mind later and
charged me with rape?" 45
What we never notice is that women can "read" men's minds
perfectly well. The male perspective is right out there in the world,
plain as day, inscribed in culture, song, and myth-in all the prevail-
ing narratives.46 These narratives tell us that men want and are enti-
39 Id. Note, however, that this principle is not always carried out consistently.
When a subjective test would strengthen the hand of a powerful actor or institution, the
law will often oblige-as is illustrated by the "intent" tests used in antidiscrimination
law. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
40 For a discussion of the use of normative discourse by large institutions to lull and
paralyze the rest of us, see Normal Science, supra note 25, at 947-53, 957-62.
41 See Winter, supra note 1, at 1884, 1890-1918 (normative premise comes built into
cultural premise).
42 Wil We Ever Be Saved?, supra note 5 (role of legitimation in the development of
antidiscrimination law); see also Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049
(1978).
43 See sources cited supra notes 19, 21.
44 This is a classic but-because it obscures the role of power-poor argument
against subjective rules. See infra notes 50-66 and accompanying text.
45 This is the modem form of the age-old (and now discredited) argument that
"[r]ape is a charge easily made and hard to defend against." See Gibbs, supra note 19, at
51; Weiss, supra note 19, at 67-68. For a discussion of the evolution of rape law, see
SUSAN ESTRmcH, REAL RAPE 27-79 (1987).
46 See, e.g., Will We Ever Be Saved?, supra note 5; Oppositionists, supra note 1; Winter,
supra note 1. See also Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Vic-
1992] 819
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tled to sex, that it is a prime function of women to give it to them,47
and that unless something unusual happens, the act of sex is ordi-
nary and blameless. 48 We believe these things because that is
the way we have constructed women, men, and "normal" sexual
intercourse. 49
Notice what the objective standard renders irrelevant: a down-
cast look;50 ambivalence;5 1 the question, "Do you really think we
should?"; slowness in following the man's lead;52 a reputation for
sexual selectivity;53 virginity; youth; and innocence. 54 Indeed, only
a loud firm "no" counts, and probably only if it is repeated several
times, overheard by others, and accompanied by forceful body lan-
guage such as pushing the man and walking away briskly.55
Yet society and law accept only this latter message (or some-
thing like it), and not the former, more nuanced ones, to mean re-
fusal. Why? The "objective" approach is not inherently better or
more fair. Rather, it is accepted because it embodies the sense of
the stronger party, who centuries ago found himself in a position to
dictate what permission meant.56 Allowing ourselves to be drawn
into reflexive, predictable arguments about administrability, fair-
ness, stability, and ease of determination points us away from what
tim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) (society validates "story'; of the dominant
members, devalidates those of outsiders).
47 After a suitable period of courtship, of course.
48 For a discussion of the view that men construct women and women's role to suit
their own interests, see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES
ON LIFE AND LAW (1987).
49 lId; see also ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE (1987); Gibbs, supra note 19, at 51.
50 Our culture could easily cause us to interpret this conduct in a man to mean
resistance, sadness, or reluctance; in a woman, it is interpreted as modesty or delicate
anticipation.
51 Men believe women mean yes both when they say no and when they say maybe.
See Gibbs, supra note 19, at 49-50; Weiss, supra note 19, at 64, 67.
52 Modesty is a double standard, teaching men that the woman is supposed to be
slow, and that the antidote is for him to be forceful.
53 In our society, this reputation makes the woman even more of a prize.
54 That is, the greatest prize of all. Broadening the range of factors a court may
consider when addressing consent arguably invites a return to the old approach, now
largely repudiated, allowing inquiry into a woman's sexual history during a rape prose-
cution. However, a woman's sexual experience bears little on whether or not she agreed
to have sex on this occasion. Her downcast look, reluctance, and history of sexual selec-
tivity, by contrast, do bear highly on whether she voluntarily agreed to have sex on this
occasion.
55 Weiss, supra note 19, at 72 (quoting Dartmouth women); Goodman, supra note
21 (survey found that women often considered degree of force "severe," while men
believed it to be consistent with seduction).
56 For a discussion of cultural hegemony and the role of dominant narratives in
structuring what we see and what we feel permitted to do, see, e.g., Oppositionists, supra
note I; Same Stories, supra note 31 (age-old categories embedded in legal classification
systems confine thought to safe, well-trodden paths, making reform difficult even to im-
agine); Legal Storytelling, supra note 34; GRAMSCI, supra note 37; Matsuda, supra note 46.
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really counts: the way in which stronger parties have managed to
inscribe their views and interests into "external" culture, so that we
are now enamored with that way ofjudging action.57 First, we read
our values and preferences into the culture;58 then we pretend to
consult that culture meekly and humbly in order to judge our own
acts. 59 A nice trick if you can get away with it.
IV
WHY NOT A SUBJECTIVE STANDARD? ON BEING
"UNPRINCIPLED" ON PRINCIPLE
"But it wouldn't be fair to require more. A man would virtually
have to carry out a half-hour cross-examination before going to bed
with a woman." (Men, of course, have no difficulty quizzing wo-
men-or each other, for that matter-at length when deciding
whether to enter into a business partnership or deal, looking for
ambivalence, doubt, or strength of motivation.) A cigarette manu-
facturer would have to place a blinking neon sign on every pack of
cigarettes. 6° (Fine---cigarette manufacturers do just that when they
install billboards aimed at creating demand and convincing new
consumers that placing a burning carcinogenic object in their
mouths is desirable and a path to social acceptance.) To get their
message into your minds, stronger parties are perfectly willing to go
to great effort and expense.6 1 But to find out whether you are willing
to do what they want, we must rely on simple, easily ascertained
"objective" factors. 62
The subordinate party, naturally, prefers the subjective stan-
dard. No matter how limited one's resources or range of options,
no matter how unequal one's bargaining position, at least one's
thoughts are free.63 Small wonder that the recent legal-storytelling
57 See supra notes 1-5, 25-26, 32-40 and accompanying text. Cigarette manufactur-
ers believe that they discharge their obligations to the consumer by printing "objective"
and highly visible warnings. Yet it is obvious that the adequacy of the warnings requires
an interpretive judgment, one that arguably ought to be made in light of the multiple
factors inherent in the setting in which they are used. See supra notes 10-14 and accom-
panying text.
58 See Normal Science, supra note 25, at 942-44.
59 Ild (noting that we often fail even to notice the self-deception).
60 See Garner, supra note 10.
61 The tobacco industry spends untold dollars on advertising and lobbying-some
of which is intended to persuade us and our elected representatives that the manufactur-
ers have a right to do what they are doing. Cf Normal Science, supra note 25, at 938 (right
to smoke counterbalanced by right against second-hand smoke).
62 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (this purported "superiority" of
the standard comes prepacked by history and usage; it is now part of the meaning of
"fairness").
63 In the words of the German folk song, "Meine Gedanken sindfrei" (my thoughts
are free).
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movement has had such appeal to people of color, women, gays and
lesbians.64 Stories inject a new narrative into our society.65 They
demand attention; if aptly told, they win acceptance or, at a mini-
mum, respect.6 6 This is why women demand to tell their account of
forced sex,67 why cancer victims insist that their smoking was a
redressable harm despite the tobacco companies' pathetic warn-
ings,68 and why patient advocates demand a fundamental restructur-
ing of the doctor-patient relationship. 69
V
A FINAL EXAMPLE AND CONCLUSION
I began by observing that law-talk can lull and gull us, tricking
us into thinking that categories like objective and subjective, and the
stylized debates that swirl about them, really count when in fact they
either collapse or appear trivial when viewed from the perspective of
cultural power. If we allow ourselves to believe that these categories
do matter, we can easily expend too much energy replicating pre-
dictable, scripted arguments-and in this way, the law turns once-
progressive people into harmless technocrats. 70
But this happens in a second way as well, when we borrow
their tools for our projects without sensing the danger in that use.
For example, a recent article by a Critical Race scholar proposes a
novel approach to the impact-intent dichotomy in antidiscrimination
law. 7 1 Most persons of majority race, including judges, are not pre-
64 See Oppositionists, supra note 1, at 2412-14; DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987) (telling series of "Chronides"
aimed at exposing mean or self-serving nature of majoritarian law and beliefs regarding
civil rights and racial justice); PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS
(1991) (discourse of law perpetuates white-over-black injustice).
65 Oppositionists, supra note 1, at 2412-18.
66 Id. at 2412-18, 2431-35, 2439-41, 2441 n.89 (discussing the use of an anony-
mous leaflet and how counterstories may become effective).
67 Robin West is the prime advocate of the view that women must tell and retell
their stories of patriarchy and sexual oppression. See Robin West, Authority, Autonomy,
and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard
Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985). See also Patricia Meisol, A New Genre of Legal Scholar-
ship: Storytelling Feminist Takes on the Fundamentals of Law, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1988, pt. V,
at 8 ("We need to flood the market with our stories until we get one simple point
across").
68 Viz, "[This] may be dangerous to your health."
69 See Legal Storytelling, supra note 34 (containing articles by Ball, Bell, Delgado,
Luban, Williams, Winter, and others); Richard Delgado, Mindset and Metaphor, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1872, 1874 (1990); Richard Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really
Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95, 100-02 (1990); Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfa-
ther's Stories, and Immigration Law: The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 34 ST. Louis
LJ. 425 (1990).
70 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
71 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
SHADOWBOXING
pared to see subtle forms of "institutional" or "latter-day" racism in
the absence of vicious intent. That is, "impact" alone is not
enough.7 2 To bridge the gap between currently unredressable, un-
intentional discrimination and the redressable, intentional kind,
Charles Lawrence proposes that the law recognize a third, uncon-
scious form of redressable discrimination. 7 So far, so good. But his
article goes on to propose a "cultural test" for this sort of uncon-
scious racism. 74 Under Lawrence's test, unconscious racism is
redressable if, in light of prevailing cultural m6anings and under-
standings, the action is racist.7 5 It is no defense that the actor did
not intend racial harm; if persons in the culture would reasonably
interpret his act as racially offensive, the court will as well.
Although Lawrence's article has won an enthusiastic reception
from moderate, liberal writers, the cultural-meaning test takes the
teeth out of his proposal. Majority society has defined racial reality in
such a way that relatively few acts are seen as racist.7 6 "Racism" is
limited to those rare individual (not institutional) acts of a vicious,
indefensible, shocking sort. It tends to be associated with persons
of another class, who have'little political influence and lack the abil-
ity to structure society in such a way that your and my forms of ra-
cism are condemned. 77 Lawrence would have done better to couple
his suggestion with proposals to, change the legal culture, as the
storytelling movement sets out to do. Instead, he proposes small
doctrinal adjustments within that culture which will prove ineffective
because they do not consider the systems of power and knowledge
within which all interpretive acts take place.
Sometimes a gestalt switch is necessary.78 As in a drawing by
Escher, a figure will stand out only if we focus on the background
and ignore the foreground at which we have been staring. If we
constantly skirmish with the legal foreground when it is the back-
ground that has causal efficacy, we are unlikely to get anywhere. I
propose that in many cases it will behoove us to examine the legal
background-the bundle of assumptions, baselines, presupposi-
72 Id at 317-31 (discussing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and other
intent-impact cases).
73 Id at 317-39.
74 Id at 351-74.
75 Id
76 See Darryl Brown, Note, Racism and Race Relations in the University, 76 VA. L. REV.
295 (1990); Richard Delgado, Recasting the American Race Problem, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1389
(1991); sources cited supra notes 26-32.
77 See sources cited supra note 76. For a discussion of the implications of construct-
ing antidiscrimination law in this fashion, see BELL, supra note 64, at 26-75; DERRICK A.
BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 1-51 (2d ed. 1980).
78 I am grateful to Steven Winter for this metaphor.
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tions, and received wisdoms-against which the familiar interpretive
work of courts and legislatures takes place2 9 Sometimes, all the rest
is shadowboxing.80
79 Oppositionists, supra note 1, at 2412-13.
80 Winter, supra note 1. See also Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narra-
tives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1929 (1991) (because legal
and popular culture determine both literary narratives and legal forms of thought, the
hope that one can transform or "save" the other is probably vain).
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